





RELATIONS OF THE STATES.

SPEECH OF

HON. JOHN J. CRITTENDEN, OF KENTUCKY,

ON THE DAVIS RESOLUTIONS,

In the U. S. Senate, May 24, 1860.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The motion is not agreed to; and the resolutions of the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. DAVIS) are before the Senate, on which the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. CRITTENDEN) is entitled to the floor.

Mr. CRITTENDEN. Mr. President, it is not my purpose to make a speech. I have no prepared speech, nor any preparation for a speech. I desire only to express my views in relation to certain particular questions that have been presented with some prominence in the course of this long debate; and one of the most interesting and important of those questions is that which affects the relation existing between a territorial government and the Government of the United States. It is supposed by some, as it seems, that those territorial governments, when organized under the authority of Congress, have certain independent powers of their own, not conferred, but inherent in them, as a sort of sovereignty or political power independent of any that may have been conferred by express delegation of Congress.

My idea upon that subject, Mr. President, without a shadow of doubt, is that a territorial government is the mere creature of Congress, made and fashioned by Congress as it pleases, with what functions it pleases, with what power it thinks proper to confer; that all these powers are liable to be resumed at any time, or to be fashioned, and controlled, and changed at the pleasure of Congress, and according to its discretion. Of course, there is no sovereignty or particle of sovereignty in the Territory; all is a mere delegation of power, and is in subordination at all times to the Congress of the United States. I know of no sovereignty in this country, no supreme political power, except that originally vested in the people of the United States. They are the natural depositaries, they are the natural owners of everything like supreme power or sovereignty. They have, to form this Government, delegated a certain portion of that sovereignty to the Congress of the United States. The whole, then, of this sovereignty, exists, as to that part not delegated, in the people. As to that part which they have delegated, that is in Congress; and here is the disposition of the whole sovereign supreme power of this country. None has been delegated to any one else. None, certainly, has been delegated to the territorial governments.

They are, as I first stated, the mere creatures of Congress, without any power, any function, except what Congress, by the act establishing that government, has pleased to grant; and that always held at the arbitrament of Congress itself. There can be none other. There is no place in our written system of laws for it. The people is the original and the natural source of all this sovereignty. All remains in them except what they have granted. They have granted no portion of it except to the General Government. Certainly, they have granted none to the territorial governments. The whole practical sovereignty of the country over its Territories is vested in the Congress of the United States then; what they have granted to the Territories belongs to the Territories, and nothing more. That is my idea on this subject. Congress, in constituting the territorial government, may grant just so much as it pleases of the power of legislation, and any other power to govern, to the territorial government; and the territorial government may exercise whatever is granted to it. If Congress had the power, for instance, of expelling or excluding slavery from the Territories, they might grant even that to the territorial government.

Not wasting any more time upon this subject, I wish to call the attention of the Senate

for a moment to a calm consideration of the real grievance at which these resolutions are aimed, and for the correction of which they are intended. What is that, sir? The grievance complained of is that slave property in the Territories is left, not only without adequate protection, or may be left without adequate protection, but may be left to the cures of the territorial government impairing the right of property in slaves. That is the grievance. It is an apprehension that the Territories will not give laws adequate to the protection of such property; but on the contrary, may act against that property by hostile or unfriendly legislation. That is the apprehended evil. I believe my honorable friend from Mississippi, who introduced these resolutions, did, at the time he proposed them, admit that there existed now no actual grievance calling for the interposition of this Government.

Mr DAVIS. As my friend from Kentucky refers to me, I would merely say that I did not intend either to admit or deny the fact. I considered the declaration of principle to be coeternal with the existence of our Government, and coextensive with the whole country, not necessarily dependent upon the particular fact in relation to any particular locality; and neither intended to admit or deny.

Mr CRITTENDEN. I understand the gentleman now. The amendment which is proposed, and which is now the immediate subject of debate, declares that there is no such existing grievance at the present moment. It is, then, according to the resolution itself, an apprehended or prospective mischief against which the power of this Government is to be invoked for the purpose of securing that description of property in the Territories. As the territorial government has no sovereign or independent right to act on this subject, the Supreme Court of the United States having determined that every citizen of the United States may go into that Territory carrying his slaves with him, and holding them there, my opinion is, that the Constitution is to protect that property which it has authorized to go there. Of course, that is a logical conclusion. It seems to me it is unquestionable. To assert my right to go there, to carry my property there, and to enjoy that property, and then to say there is anybody stronger or mightier or more sovereign than the Constitution that can take from me that which the Constitution says I shall have and enjoy, or shall expel me from the place where the Constitution says I may go, I can imagine nothing so inconsistent and so contradictory. I say, therefore, when the proper or extreme case occurs; when property going there under the sanction of the Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States, shall require such interposition, that it is the duty of Congress to interpose and grant protection. Give it, and give it adequately. That is my opinion.

But still there is much to be considered in relation to this subject. When your property goes there; when it constitutes a part of the political community; and when a limited control over that property is given to a territorial government, who is to make police laws to regulate such property? Is it not, in every case, a question of expediency, whether this Government will interfere? Here is a community made up of citizens differing in opinion, as we do, upon this subject of slavery; here is ample power to pass all police laws, and all laws for the internal government of the country, blacks as well as whites included. When is Congress to interfere? Is there any case now demanding an interference? This resolution supposes not; I suppose not. I suppose that there is no existing case in which Congress would think it wise or expedient now to interfere by the exercise of its admitted power of interposition when necessary. Would it be policy in Congress to interpose except in an extreme case? The ground upon which you would interfere must be made up of a variety of circumstances, to be judged of at the time. What is the difficulty in the interference? What is the state of things existing in the Territory? What is the opposition likely to ensue from the people of the Territory? What is the magnitude of the evil which you are to correct? Is it a very small one, likely soon to pass away? Is it of such magnitude as to require your interposition? These are considerations that must always enter into that question of expediency when it is presented to Congress; and it is grateful to me to be able to say, as gentlemen seem to admit here, that there is no necessity for such an interposition. Exact right may not be done, exact treatment may not be extended to slaveholders in Territories where there is a great majority of Republicans; but still they are not of such magnitude as to justify a great national movement on the subject. There is a maxim that it is better that a particular wrong should be endured than a great public inconvenience incurred. That is the law at least, whether to be applied literally or not. I quote it merely as a warning to us not to interfere upon too slight grounds. I admit the right to interfere; I admit even the duty to interfere when the proper case is presented; but that proper case must be an extreme one to require the exercise of an extreme power on our part. The evil, I best, in a territorial government, is a temporary one. It likely will not consist in more than a few individual instances or cases. The question of the right of such property to be held and to exist in a Territory is so firmly established that I cannot con-

ceive any territorial legislature will, so far, consider itself warranted in usurping the power of expelling the slaves which the Constitution has said, by interpretation of the federal court, to be sure, may be carried and may be held there. That would require only that we should repeal that law. That I would be perfectly willing to do.

I think therefore, sir, if there is no case existing now, it will be still less likely to exist hereafter. All this debate, all this earnest and zealous and heated controversy is merely in prospect of an evil which is only apprehended. None exists. When is it likely to exist, and where? With every day I trust the danger of such a necessity is diminished. Kansas will soon be taken from the class of territorial governments. Where are we likely to have any such difficulty as that which these resolutions apprehend, of an assault made by Territorial Legislatures upon slavery within their territories? Are there any slaves in Washington? Will there be any question about slavery in Utah! In New Mexico? Why, sir, these are not regions to which you could by invitation carry slavery. Well, where is there to be a Territory hereafter formed in which any controversy whatever about slavery is likely to arise? Kansas disposed of, does there remain any territory to which slavery if invited would go? I know of none. I will not affirm it is so exactly in regard to every portion of our territory; but I believe there is none of sufficient importance to form a State which would be at all acceptable to the slaveholders, if permitted without the least hindrance to take possession of it. They can find a more genial climate, and a better soil, on which to employ this labor.

There is, then, not only no actual existing evil, but there is no prospect of any. Why, then, at such a time, should the country be agitated by the prospect of such a distant evil? The evil of the day is enough; and, it seems to me, if this be so, we are making a present evil out of an apprehension of a future one, and that future one never likely to occur. Should we quarrel now, as a nation, about remedies for evils that do not exist? Shall we quarrel about remedies for evils that not only do not exist, but which it is not probable ever will exist? Is that wisdom? When shall we be freed from trouble, if this be the course of policy to be pursued? If it is said to be wise to look far ahead of us to anticipate evil, and by anticipating it, preventing it, the question is, shall we anticipate the evil for the purpose of making a quarrel over it now—a quarrel over a future cause of quarrel that we barely apprehend, and which may never occur? I want the people of the United States to understand this thing. I want the slaveholder to know, that though there may be slaveholders and slaves in Territories now existing, and Territorial Governments now existing, yet there has occurred no necessity for the interposition of this Government; that all, so far, has gone on well and quietly enough under the domestic legislation of the Territory.

Sir, when, in 1854, that great measure of the repeal of the Missouri Compromise was adopted by the Congress of the United States, one of its promised benefits was, that it should remove from the halls of Congress, and from all national controversy or discussion the question of slavery. That was supposed to be one of the benefits that would result. It was to transfer all those questions to the Territories; make them local instead of national questions; making the disturbance local to the Territory, and not national, to extend throughout the limits of the whole Republic. That was one of the promised benefits of that measure; and if it had tended even to accomplish that object, much more if it had accomplished it, it would have been a great benefit to this country. You framed the Kansas-Nebraska bill with that view. You gave them large powers of self-government. To be sure they were, as of necessity they must be, subject to this Government, liable to be changed or taken away at any time it was thought proper by this Government to do so; but still you did it with the very purpose of transferring all these slavery questions to them. Sir, the act itself has not produced the promised consequences; but when we look back to it, and when we interpret it, we must know that was one of the purposes and objects in view of the legislators who passed that bill.

The effects of that law have been modified, to be sure, by the decision of the Supreme Court. I do not know, I will not interpret it to say, that that law would have warranted the Legislature of Kansas in excluding slavery altogether, if it had been in the power of Congress to have granted such a power. It was not known whether it was in the power of Congress or not. The case of *Dred Scott* was then depending, and not decided. The case of *Dred Scott* determines that Congress had not the power, and of course could not, by the Kansas act, give it. The Kansas act could not confer the power of expelling slavery, or excluding it, upon the Legislature of the Territory of Kansas. The power was limited, then, by that decision. But for that decision, I think it would be difficult to deny that the Kansas-Nebraska bill gave full power to the territorial government on the subject. "Power to regulate their own domestic institutions in their own way." What broader terms could be used? "Power to act on all subjects of rightful legislation." What exception can you make to the generality of these powers? The Constitution, as subsequently interpreted by the Federal court, I acknowledge, declares that slavery is not a subject of legislation on the part of Congress.

Mr. President, I do not want to enlarge upon this subject. My object is to be as brief as possible. I say, then, I assume that, and I shall vote for that resolution. I do not see that that resolution has proclaimed a case which would authorize Congress to undertake the responsibility of now interposing and now legislating for the protection of slavery. I do not know that there are not sufficient laws now for its protection in any Territory. I have no such knowledge myself. No such case has been proclaimed here, and the resolutions are to lay the foundations of remedies for cases to arise hereafter. If there had been any existing, my friend from Mississippi, as the careful and able guardian of these rights, would have introduced a bill giving that protection, instead of a vain resolution that operates nothing—proclaims the mischief, and yet forbears to give redress. That would not have been his course if there was an existing case. There is no case now: there can arise no case hereafter, because there is no Territory to which slavery is likely to go.

To produce the grievance, what must occur? To produce the grievance not now existing, in any future Territory, or in any Territory now existing, we must suppose it to be so desirable as to allure slaveholders with their slaves to settle in it. Is there any probability of that? Where is the Territory to which it will go? Well, sir, you are to make that improbable conjecture; but that will not raise the case. You must suppose that, when the slaves have been carried to this new Territory, the Legislature of the territorial government will act hostilely towards it, and, by unfriendly legislation, attempt to drive it out, or to impair its value if it remains. You are to suppose a Territory for them; you are to suppose their migration to that Territory; and then you are to suppose that the legislators of that country, in violation of the duties imposed upon them by the constitutional law as it has been interpreted and laid down, will assail a property there by law, by the assumption of rights; that they will assail a property that is there by the Constitution of the United States. All these suppositions have to be made, in order to get a case out of which this grievance can arise.

What apprehension is there, then, to be entertained of an evil depending upon so many improbable events—an evil that can only result from so many contingencies? We must be prompt, we must be prone as well as prompt, it seems, to controversy, if we can presume all these things for the future; if we can presume that with so much zeal as to bring them forward, and make the future, the possible future, a cause of present mischief and of present quarrel, further to disturb the peace of this great country. Sir, I do not think it is right. When you have got them there; when all these contingencies happen, and this improbable mischief, this improbable grievance, has been complained of and is upon us, it will then be a question of consideration, how far, under what circumstances, under what extremity of evil, it will be best for this Government to interpose. The question will not be, whether a private wrong has been done to A., B., or C., in the property of his slaves, but the question will be then one of great national expediency, with a just regard for the rights of individuals, with a just and sacred determination to maintain them under all proper circumstances; for I hold that government is made for the protection of rights. Government is but the combination of the powers of all to protect the rights, and to protect the lives and liberties, of each. That is the origin of government, and the substance and end of all true government; but still there must be a prudence in the management of that government. There are a thousand considerations that the legislator has to take into view. The interests of all are concerned. So it is with every question of expediency; and this must be a question of expediency also with this government, when to interpose, and when not to interpose.

It may be said, upon principle in general, that the local government is the government best qualified to take care of the local interests of the country in which they govern. Here is one subject, however, placed beyond their control—slavery. They are taught that this is property, and entitled to protection as such. I do not mean to make any question about property in slaves or property in the service of slaves. It is all one and the same thing; and I imagine that the slaveholder does not care how it is denominated, so that the substance of his right to the practical enjoyment of it is left to him. If the gentlemen on the other side of the Chamber reject the idea of property in man, and say that it is but property in the service of man, as service is all that can be obtained from the slaves, it is perfectly equivalent, in my judgment, and, for one, I would be perfectly satisfied with that.

That property is to be protected, and must be protected, when necessary; but I confess, like the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. Toombs], I should be very slow to interpose the positive authority of this Government, unless the case was one imperiously and by necessity, as it were, demanding it. I would try other means, even to the abolition of the territorial government, and a change of its form, a change of its administrators; but protection at last the man is entitled to; and if the Government cannot give it to him, or thinks it would be detrimental to the interests of the nation to forbear in conse-

quence of great national evils that might be anticipated, let them pursue that policy. The *salus populi* is at last the great law of all communities, of all nations. It must influence our interpretations and our consideration of all questions of mere expediency. If the Government does not think proper to interfere and furnish protection, let the Government indemnify the citizen for the wrongs he has suffered. There might be cases of that sort.

But, sir, I did not intend to go into these imaginary cases. That was not my purpose. It was to express the opinion that there was no necessity for it now, in the midst of all the strife we have had on the subject, and it is not likely any future grievance will arise, because of the want of territory in which it could occur. If any territory should be found which would attract slaveholders with that property there, it is not to be presumed that a territorial legislature, subordinate as it is to this Government—its governor liable to be turned out, its judges liable to be all turned out by the President in a moment—would take upon itself, in the very face of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, to legislate against slavery, for the purpose of destroying or impairing the value of the property of one of their fellow-citizens. Would the Governor allow it so far as he could help it? Would the judges allow it, with the certain knowledge that their removal from office would be, as it ought to be, the consequence of such a departure from their duty? There would be a just apprehension on the part of the whole Territory that the Government of the United States, who had given them these large powers, and the privileges of exercising a sort of self-government, might take away power from the hands of those who defied the public authority, and abused the trust with which they had been invested. Would they not be under the just apprehension that all these powers would be taken away by the Government whose authority they had abused? Would not that restrain them from any attempts at the violation of the property of their neighbors? I want the people of the United States to consider all these things, and subdue the alarms which they now feel, as though there were an instant overhanging danger upon the country.

Sir, there is nothing so marvellous in the history of the country, under its present aspect, as the agitation which now exists throughout its borders, compared with the general prosperity which prevails. In all its glorious progress, did ever this country exhibit a fairer picture of human prosperity and human happiness than it does to-day? Nature has bestowed all her bounties. This is a land of plenty and abundance, without weight or measure; the freest Government on earth. What citizen of this Republic is unlawfully imprisoned to-day, from one end of this country to the other? What white man can say he is unjustly oppressed by the Government? Do you know of one? Does anybody know of one? Can such a thing be said of any country on the face of the globe but our own? Prisoners of state can be found everywhere else. The voice of oppression can be heard elsewhere. In our country that voice is unknown. And yet, sir, these agitations upon this subject have created a discontent from one end of the land to the other. The minds of the people are disturbed in the midst of all this prosperity.

The Republican party, it seems to me, has taken some progress; but I must say this beautiful picture of peace and happiness has received its only wound from the agitation which they have maintained on the subject of slavery. I say this in a spirit of the most perfect fraternity. We enter on a cause productive of evils without knowing, without intending them. We are urged on, and one step is taken after another, until we see the evil and regret it; but other interests and other passions, and other purposes, still urge us on, and we take the hazard of all the evils we see. It is said it is but agitation; that will destroy nobody. Sir, moderation is demanded of us now on all sides. The restoration of peace and tranquillity is all that is necessary to consummate that national prosperity and that national happiness to which I have referred. Providence has done everything for us, and we are the authors of all that mars the picture. Is there any real or substantial cause for pursuing a course in politics that we see and know has led to this discontent and this alienation? Is there any object that you can accomplish by it that is at all worth that? Is there any price too high for that which will purchase the restoration of kindness and natural affection with a brother with whom we have been offended? What price would you not set upon that, and what sacrifice would you not make for it? You are told if you are at the altar ready with your offering, and remember that your brother is offended with you, to lay down your offering, go and be reconciled to your brother, and then go and offer to your Maker the evidence of your devotion. We should employ a little of that spirit with our own people. Let us all do that, North and South.

Mr. President, I speak of these subjects with a judgment as firm and determined as my judgment is capable or susceptible of, but without any unkindness, much less with acrimony. I am one of those who would desire before I make my offering even to be reconciled to my brother. Men must be supposed to intend all that their acts tend to

produce. They are the authors of them, whether they hold themselves responsible or not. They are not more responsible for the act they do, than they are for the natural, probable, ensuing consequences of the act. There have been indiscretions on all sides. The blame has not been on one side, so far as ill language and mutual reproaches are concerned; it has been on all sides. The controversy of bitter words once commenced, spreads everywhere, though you may not be able to find the beginning of it.

But now, if what I have said in relation to the probability of slavery desiring or seeking to be carried into these Territories be at all true, what reason is there for your pursuing a policy which the circumstances of Kansas did at one time seem to give some plausibility to? That is settled. That was the great cause which led you to action. It was so proclaimed. The object was to repair the wrong done to Kansas, by the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, or in consequence of it. That was the mischief compounded of. To redress that was the ground on which this now powerful and great party arrayed itself. That you have accomplished. You have accomplished it by ways and means that must have been disagreeable to you in their consequences. You saw that it offended your brethren; you saw that it injured your brethren. The discussion of such a subject, pressed to their very borders, pressed over their borders, and among their slaves, could not be otherwise than hurtful, as well as offensive. As States of this Union, in the language of these resolutions, they considered themselves pledged to hold fast to and to give all necessary aid and comfort to every State with which they were associated in the Union—to all their sister States; to use that language which signifies affectionate relations. But in inconsistency with, whether or not in violation of those relations, whether falsely or inadvertently done, you brought these heated discussions up to the very borders of your sister States. The voice went abroad through their land of a character calculated to produce insurrection; calculated to produce every crime known to us. Was this right? You say you have a right to discuss the morality of every subject that affects any of your countrymen, in order to inform them and reason with them. As a general proposition, it is true, and such admonition ought, perhaps, to be thankfully received. But this is a case where every man must see exceptional reasons apply. This is an exception. Would a military man, a commander-in-chief, be justified in acting upon this doctrine of allowing every evil to be denounced, and giving a free and unlimited and chartered right to all who choose to discuss these evils; to give out their own undigested ideas, foreign ideas, novel ideas, in order to influence others? Would that be tolerated in a camp? Suppose one of the good men of the world now, who is the advocate of universal peace, and looks upon war as the greatest of all human crimes—suppose one of these apostles of peace were to insist upon going into the camp, and, as one of the means of preventing war, to endeavor to disband the army of his country; would you not hold the commander-in-chief guilty, who should allow that man to preach with all his eloquence to the soldiers, the great virtue of deserting the standard of their country, and of being ministers of the great peace system, which they would accomplish some part of by running away from their country's standard; by rising in mutiny, and putting an end to those officers who, if not destroyed, might be courting wars hereafter, to teach them the tyranny that was exercised over them by their officers, and say to them, "you are here inveigled into camp for a few dollars; you are, in the morning, drilled by the sergeant; you are made to hold yourselves in this way, and in that way, and to play the very slave before him; now, can you as freemen bear this; rise, assert your rights, and make your way to peace everywhere over the land?" What is the difference between that and the course to which I have just alluded?

Sir, I make these remarks in no spirit of offence. You have received wrongs, and you have inflicted some. In the controversies of this world, it never happens that all the wrong is on one side, and all the right on the other. No such exquisite divisions are made on this earth. Where there is a long quarrel existing, a long trouble, all the wrong is never on one side; all the right is never on one side. A knowledge of this should teach us all moderation. This is the great duty we owe our country. The little petty duties we owe our party are as nothing; yet, in practice, we seem to place them above the great duty to our country.

Now I see that this one of the great parties of the country to which I have alluded, after having accomplished the object which it put forth to the world as its only object, still says that the existing state of things demands the perpetuation of that party. You now find cause for perpetuating it. It has increased in power. What is the reason why it should be perpetuated? Is it to be perpetuated? Is a party so founded, so created, and upon such questions as make up the foundation of the Republican party, now to declare the necessity of its perpetuation for the purpose of enforcing and enjoying political power? If you enjoy it according to the tenure by which you have obtained it, you must do it with all this anti-slavery sort of warfare by which it has arisen. As long as you stand arrayed in that way on the borders of your sister States where

slavery exists—and I regret to be compelled by the necessity of the case to use the word “slavery” here—while you stand thus, you disturb their peace. You do not intend, the great liberal and enlightened portion of this body, who keep up this party for the purpose of its political rewards and its political honors, do not intend really to do any actual mischief to the other States. You acknowledge their rights; you declare against the invasion of these rights; but that declaration does nothing; that declaration restrains no man’s arm. Do you not know that when you are denouncing slavery with all its horrors, and with all its immoralities, as it presents itself to your minds, though you will not actually strike, yet there are others by your side who may strike, that there are others not so enlightened, intelligent, or forbearing, who, urged on by your own very doctrines, will take upon themselves the lawless and the murderous task, by their own means and their own bloody hands, of enforcing your doctrines? You have found that in one instance; you may find it in others; and of what advantage is all this? None that I can see. I know you, gentlemen; and I know that there is not one of you here who would countenance such an act. I know it would not be more abhorrent to me than it would be to you. But when you see that these things will follow in the course of that great host which you led on in political warfare, and that they will act, as they suppose, upon your own lessons and instructions, though, perhaps, misinterpreted, and do the mischief that you would scorn; that they will do the mischief that may be fatal to the peace of their country; that one hand may hold the brand that burns down the temple; when you know that there is such a danger as that upon you, a danger that you cannot suppress, does it not show you the necessity of a more temperate and moderate course on this subject? Imitate the action of our fathers. You often appeal to the fathers, and it is a sacred appeal that ought to go to every heart. You appeal to the fathers: from 1790 down to 1835, for forty-five long years, did our fathers ever breathe out dissension or agitation in this land on this subject? I cite this merely to show that the thing may be done, and it has been done. It was done by our fathers: and are we so degenerate already that we cannot do the same thing?

We have got into mutual excitements on this subject, mutual rights, mutual wrongs; and I will not stop here now to inquire who is most to blame. I might find fault with you, but I do not choose now to stop here and make the inquiry, whether you are most to blame or your brethren of the South. You are both, no doubt, to blame. The sooner we can put an end to this strife, the better. I am one of those who believe confidently in this Union; its political stability, its everlasting power and stability. Though we talk lightly about its overthrow,—it is not to be overthrown. It has a foundation too broad. We can well turn over this world, and say this Government occupies a large portion of it. This Government has the whole land for its foundation; and every true heart within that land is one of the pillars to sustain it; and every true hand, one of the hands by which it is to be maintained and defended, whether North or South. Why, then, shall we, bound together by such noble sentiments as well as by such great and controlling interests, make little quarrels now to bring our peace, at any rate, to the very verge of ruin, and, humanly speaking, to bring our country in danger, and our Union and our Constitution? The Constitution and the Union are one and the same thing. You must preserve both, or neither is preserved. The one rests on the other. It is this very Government, this identical Government, that makes all this great country ours; that makes this American liberty which we enjoy, our liberty. Shall we fritter away in little broils and petty controversies, as they are, all these great gifts, all these great endowments which we have received from our fathers and that Providence which is above us all? Look back. You have no reason for perpetuating a party that carries in its hands the signal of war to every Southern State—at any rate, those States so regard it—and every step of your march is pregnant with influences full of mischief, not intended by you, but operating upon the mind of the more enthusiastic and superstitious. I deplore this strife. I see the mischief. That mischief will continually increase. It is of the nature of mischief to increase. It grows by what it feeds on. It feeds on the Constitution and the institutions of the country. It feeds on the hearts of our countrymen. It is there to corrode; it is there to displace all kindly and affectionate feelings which ought to unite us as countrymen, and to put in a poison that shall create nothing but spleen and enmity. That is what this question feeds on; and, feeding on that, it will continue to grow more loathsome and more detestable and more dangerous day by day.

Mr. President, I did not intend any part of all this, and I am sorry for the time I have occupied, and I shall not occupy the time of the Senate any further. I will merely say a word further. I have not participated in some of the main topics that have been debated on these resolutions. With all the discussions in relation to party platforms and the Charleston Convention I have nothing to do, nor have I to do with that which may be considered as the more domestic concerns of myself and my colleague in rela-

tion to the Democratic character of the State of Kentucky. Sir, I shall have no debate or controversy as to the statements that have been made on that subject. My colleague has made them in all sincerity, I have no doubt. This is all I have to say about it—that I hope and trust in God that the people of Kentucky will do whatsoever they find right upon every occasion on which the State is called on to act. I look to her honor and look to the preservation of her high character, to do what is best for her country whenever her country's danger or her country's interests shall summon her to act. I will not tie her to the tail of a Democratic party or to the tail of any other party to be dragged along. She belongs to no party, sir. Free and independent as she was of old, she is yet, and nobody has a right to count upon her, except we, who calculate that she will do what honor and patriotism dictate. We can safely say she will do that, if left unbiased by extraordinary circumstances to control her.

LIST OF PRICES OF BRECKINRIDGE AND LANE CAMPAIGN DOCUMENTS.

No. 1.—Speeches of Hon. HUMPHREY MARSHALL and Hon. B. F. HALLETT, in the City of Washington, on the nomination of BRECKINRIDGE and LANE, . . . price \$5 per 1000	No. 6.—Speech of DANIEL S. DICKINSON, at the Cooper Institute, New York City, July 18, 1860, \$10 per 1000
No. 2.— <i>Minority Report</i> of Gov. STEVENS, showing the grounds upon which the regular Southern Delegation were entitled to seats in the Convention at the Front Street Theatre, Baltimore— <i>Majority Platform and Letters of Acceptance</i> by BRECKINRIDGE and LANE, . . . \$5 per 1000	No. 7.—Speech of Hon. B. F. HALLETT, and <i>Minority Report</i> of Gov. STEVENS, \$5 per 1000
No. 3.— <i>Defence of the National Democracy</i> against the attack of Judge DOUGLAS— <i>Constitutional Rights of the States</i> :—Speech of Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN, of Louisiana. Delivered in the Senate of the United States, May 22, 1860, \$10 per 1000	No. 8.— <i>Biographical Sketches</i> of BRECKINRIDGE and LANE, \$15 per 1000
No. 4.—Speech of President BUCHANAN, July 9, 1860, \$5 per 1000	No. 9.—Reply of Hon. JEFFERSON DAVIS, of Mississippi, to the Speech of Senator DOUGLAS, in the U. S. Senate, May 16 and 17, 1860, \$10 per 1000
	No. 10.—Speech of JOHN C. BRECKINRIDGE, at Frankfort, Ky., \$5 per 1000
	No. 11.—Speech of JOHN C. BRECKINRIDGE, on the occasion of the removal from the Old Senate Chamber to the New, . . . \$5 per 1000
	No. 12.—Speech of Hon. J. J. CRITTENDEN, of Ky., on the Relations of the States. Delivered in the U. S. Senate, May 24, 1860, . . . \$5 per 1000



